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Abstract
The recent literature has suggested that macroeconomic forecasters may have asymmetric loss
functions, and that there may be heterogeneity across forecasters in the degree to which they weigh
under and over-predictions. Using an individual-level analysis that exploits the SPF respondents
histogram forecasts, we nd little evidence of asymmetric loss for the ination forecasters.
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cation: C53, E31, E37
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine US ination expectations over the last forty years (1969 to 2010) making
use of the Survey of Professional Forecasters data. Our particular interest is in whether the forecasters
have asymmetric loss functions. In the extreme case, asymmetric loss permits forecasters to be full-
information rational-expectations(FI-RE) forecasters while still accounting for the empirical observation
that forecasters disagree, provided that their loss functions exhibit di¤erent degrees of asymmetry.
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There are a number of other explanations of why forecasters disagree, such as sticky information (see,
e.g., Mankiw and Reis (2002), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)),
noisy information (Woodford (2001), Sims (2003)) as well as di¤erent views about the long-run values
of variables like ination and output growth (e.g., Patton and Timmermann (2010, 2011)) and di¤erent
signals and interpretation of those signals (e.g., Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999), Lahiri and Sheng (2008)
and Manzan (2011)). Our focus is the explanation proposed by Capistrán and Timmermann (2009)
which stresses heterogeneity in the degree of asymmetry in loss functions, whereby individuals weigh
costs to over and under-predictions di¤erently.
We consider the evidence for asymmetric loss using a testing procedure originally applied by Clements
(2009) to the output growth forecasts. This approach makes use of the ination histograms reported by
the SPF respondents. Clements (2010) applies the approach of Clements (2009) to the SPF ination
forecasts but in a panel data context. That analysis generally was not supportive of the hypothesis
that the SPF respondents are FI-RE forecasters with asymmetric loss functions. We re-visit the issue
of the ination forecasts and asymmetric loss using an individual-level analysis (as in the application
by Clements (2009) to the output growth forecasts) and allow the degree of asymmetry to di¤er across
respondents. A second innovation is to t the generalized beta distribution to the histograms to calculate
forecast moments, as opposed to normal distributions as in earlier work. This should lessen possible
distortions to the moment estimates from tting a symmetric distribution such as the normal. As argued
by Giordani and Söderlind (2003), a normal distribution may provide a reasonable approximation to the
aggregate histograms, but may be less appropriate for the individual histograms. We follow Engelberg,
Manski and Williams (2009) in tting generalized beta distributions to the SPF histograms, which we
regard as current best practice, in recognition that our results on the empirical relevance of loss function
asymmetry may be sensitive to the way in which forecast moments are calculated from the histograms.
We also consider only those histograms which provide enough information on the underlying subjective
distribution to enable such a distribution to be t. We would expect this to further reduce measurement
error in our estimates of forecast moments. We also check the sensitivity of the results to the distribution
we t to the histograms. Thirdly, we consider the point predictions and histogram means as rival forecasts
in a forecast encompassing framework, where the expectation is that the latter should forecast encompass
the former in terms of predicting outcomes, if agents have asymmetric loss.
The SPF is chosen because it is provides information on individualsforecast moments, which will
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be shown to greatly facilitate the testing of the asymmetry hypothesis, and because it has been running
for long enough to support an individual-level analysis with a reasonable number of respondents.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the Capistrán and Timmer-
mann (2009) explanation of the empirical correlation between disagreement and uncertainty (see, e.g.,
Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987)), and the framework for testing for asymmetric loss of Clements (2009).
Section 3 describes the SPF forecast data, and how it is used to test the asymmetric loss hypothesis.
Section 4 describes the results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Asymmetric Loss
The Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) explanation of the observed correlation between disagreement
and uncertainty rests on the SPF point forecasts being generated by individuals seeking to minimize
asymmetric loss functions.1 Although Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) assume a specic asymmetric
loss function, namely linex loss (see Varian (1975)), the results in Patton and Timmermann (2007) show
that we can obtain essentially the same conclusions for a general asymmetric loss function, provided
only weak restrictions are put on the form of that loss function and the data generating process. The
requirement of the data generating process is that the variable of interest is conditionally location-scale
distributed, and the requirement of the loss function is that it is homogeneous in the forecast error.2
Letting Et (yt+h)  E (yt+h j 
t), and Vt (yt+h)  V ar (yt+h j 
t), and et+h;t denote the h-step ahead
forecast error, then formally we are assuming that:
yt+h j 
t  D (Et [yt+h] ; Vt [yt+h]) ;
for some constant distribution function D, and:
L (a  et+h;t) = g (a)L (et+h;t) ;
1Following the key insight of Granger (1969) and Zellner (1986) that optimal forecasts will be biased if the loss function
is asymmetric, much of the recent literature has sought to test whether forecasts are rational once we allow forecasters
to have asymmetric loss functions: see, for example, Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005), Elliott, Komunjer and
Timmermann (2008) and Patton and Timmermann (2007).
2Homogeneity of the loss function rules out linex loss. A practical implication of adopting the Patton and Timmermann
(2007) framework rather than linex loss (together with the assumption that the data generating process is conditionally
normal, in order to obtain an expression for the optimal predictor) is that the optimal predictor should depend on the
conditional standard deviation, rather than the conditional variance.
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for some positive function g, and all a 6= 0. Patton and Timmermann (2007, Proposition 2) show that
the optimal forecast is given by:
ft+h;t = Et (yt+h) + h 
p
Vt (yt+h) (1)
where h is a constant that depends on the form of D and L. If h < 0 then over-predictions are more
costly than under-predictions (and vice versa for h > 0). The more likely over-prediction (because the
more uncertain the outlook, captured by the varianceterm), then the more the forecaster will aim to
under-predict on average. Hence the bias of a rational forecaster should depend on the forecast standard
deviation3 but not on other variables known at time t:
E (yt+h   ft+h;t j 
t) = E

yt+h  

Et (yt+h) + h 
p
Vt (yt+h)

j 
t

=  h 
p
Vt (yt+h):
Hence Pesaran and Weale (2006) suggest testing for rational expectations with asymmetric losses by
running a regression such as:
et+h;t  yt+h   ft+h;t = 1
p
Vt (yt+h) + 
0
2Zt + t+h (2)
where under the null we would expect to nd 02 = 0, but 1 6= 0 if loss is asymmetric.
Forecasters with the same conditional mean will disagree (have di¤erent point forecasts) when
either i) they di¤er with regard to their conditional standard deviation of future ination (ination
uncertainty) or ii) they attach di¤erent relative costs to under and over-predictions (i 6= ). Moreover,
for given values of i, the extent of disagreement across forecasters will vary positively with uncertainty.
Allowing individuals to have di¤erent loss functions, we can test for rational expectations via regressions
for each respondent such as (2):
et+h;t;i  yt+h   ft+h;t;i = 1;i
q
Vt;i (yt+h) + 
0
2;iZt + t+h;i (3)
where 2;i = 0 under rational expectations, and 1;i = 0 under symmetric loss, but we would expect to
3Under linex loss the optimal predictor is given by ft+h;t = Et (yt+h)+

2
Vt (yt+h), where the parameter  determines
the degree of asymmetry in the linex loss function: L
 
et+h;t; 

=  2

exp
 
et+h;t
  et+h;t   1.
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nd 1;i 6= 0 under asymmetric loss. In terms of forecasting macroaggregates such as ination it seems
reasonable to suppose that the relevant information is public, so accessible to all, so the test regressors Zt
typically will not have an i subscript. The main problem with (3) is obtaining a measure of
p
Vt;i (yt+h).4
Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) assume that forecast uncertainty is the same across all individuals,
and measure it as the one-quarter ahead conditional variance from a GARCH model tted to the errors
of an AR model for ination. The nding of Rich and Tracy (2003) that there is no relationship between
the conditional variance of the consensus errors and an ex ante measure of uncertainty casts doubt on
this step. Model-based forecasts of the conditional variance are necessarily backward-looking and will
adjust slowly when the economic environment changes relative to forecasters perceptions. It seems likely
that assuming a constant-parameter GARCH model for a period that spans the Great Moderation might
lead to the degree of persistence in ination volatility being over-estimated.5
Clements (2009) proposes testing (1) directly for the SPF forecasts of output growth, for which
histograms forecasts are reported which can be used to estimate the required forecast moments. The
hypothesis of asymmetry is that Et;i (yt+h)   ft+h;t;i is systematically related to the forecast standard
deviation (or the forecast variance, in the case of linex loss), but rationality requires it should not
vary systematically with any variables in the individuals information set. This suggests the following
regression:
Et;i (yt+h)  ft+h;t;i = 1;i
q
Vt;i (yt+h) + 
0
2;iZt + vt+h;i: (4)
The null of rationality and quadratic loss for individual i is that 1;i = 0 and 
0
2;i = 0, against the
alternative that any of these coe¢ cients are non-zero. A rejection of the null due to 1;i 6= 0, with
02;i = 0, indicates asymmetry (and rationality), while 
0
2;i 6= 0 indicates irrationality (conditional on
the assumed form of the loss function). In order to carry out these tests, as well as the point forecasts
we require the individuals predictive distributions Pt+h;t;i (y) = Pr (Yt+h < y j 
t;i) so that Et;i (Yt+h)
and Vt;i (Yt+h) can be derived (or that these conditional moments are available directly). Estimates of
these distributions are available in the SPF in the form of histograms, as described below.
The problem with testing based on (3) can be viewed as one of measurement error, as the dependent
4Or equivalently, of Vt;i (yt+h) if instead we assume a linex loss function.
5The Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) explanation of the dispersion of ination expectations in terms of heterogeneity
in asymmetric loss is grounded on their estimates of ination volatility, which for most of the results they report are derived
from an AR(4)-GARCH(1; 1) model of US ination. They nd the coe¢ cients on lagged volatility and the lagged squared
error term sum to 0:98, indicating a highly persistent process.
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variable in (4) is related to that in (3) by:
et+h;i = yt+h   ft+h;t;i = (Et;i (yt+h)  ft+h;t;i) + (yt+h   Et;i (yt+h)) :
We let t+h; = yt+h   Et;i (yt+h). In this interpretation, t+h;i is a measurement error, such that the
dependent variable in (3) is a noisy proxy for the unobserved dependent variable Ei;t (Yt+h)   ft+h;t;i
in (4). Standard analysis suggests that if E
 
t+h;i j 
t

= 0, so that t+h;i is uncorrelated with any
variables that might be included as explanatory variables, then inference based on (3) is less precise,
but tests of both 1;i = 0 and 
0
2;i = 0 remain valid. But when E
 
t+h;i;Xti
 6= 0, where Xti =hp
Vt;i (yt+h) Z
0
t
i0
, then inference based on (3) is invalid.
As argued by Clements (2009), estimating (4) avoids the pitfalls of analyzing realized forecast errors
directly. Suppose the forecast error (constructed from the outcomes and point forecasts, i.e., et+h;i) is
regressed on variables known at the time the forecast was made, and the conditional standard deviation.
Were there a series of negative shocks to ination over the period, the individuals point forecasts may
overstate the realized rates of ination. This may show up as evidence of asymmetric loss - that the
respondent has deliberately engineered a negative bias in their forecasts to avoid costly under-predictions.
By instead considering the deviation between the point forecast and the conditional expectation, the
conditional expectation would control for the negative shocks - it too would be higher than warranted
based on an information set that includes the shocks, but unless loss truly were asymmetric there is no
reason why the deviation should systematically di¤er from zero.
3 The Survey Data
3.1 The SPF survey
The SPF quarterly survey is our source of ination expectations. The SPF began as the NBER-ASA
survey in 1968:4 and runs to the present day.6 It is a quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasters of
the US economy. The survey questions elicit information from the respondents on their point forecasts
for a number of variables and their histograms for ination and output growth. When the respondents
make their forecasts they will know the advance national accounts release for the previous quarter. The
6Since June 1990 it has been run by the Philadelphia Fed, renamed as the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF):
see Zarnowitz (1969) and Croushore (1993).
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Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia maintains a quarterly Real Time Data Set for Macroeconomists
(RTDSM): see Croushore and Stark (2001). This allows us to recreate the date on output price7 that
the respondent would have had access to, including the data for the quarter immediately prior to the
survey quarter.8
The histograms we use refer to annual ination in the current year relative to the previous year, so
that for rst-quarter surveys the forecast horizon is just under a year, whereas for fourth-quarter surveys
it is just under one quarter. In the statistical analyses we consider the surveys separately by quarter of
the year. We construct matching series of point forecasts from the SPF data. So for Q1 surveys, for
example, we sum the forecast of the current quarter and the forecasts of the next three quarters, and
divide by the data for the previous years four quarters.9
;10 For Q2 surveys the approach is the same
except the value for the preceding quarter (Q1) is now data, and similarly for surveys made in the third
and fourth quarters of the year. So we have forecasts of annual ination made in Q1 through to Q4
of that year, that match the histograms in terms of forecast target (the annual change) and forecast
horizon.
We have 169 quarterly surveys from 1968:4 to 2010:4. We exclude the surveys for which there is some
doubt about the year that the histogram returns refer to.11
The methods of calculating forecast moments are described in the following sub-section.
3.2 Fitting continuous distributions to the SPF ination histograms
We require measures of the forecast mean and variance of the annual rate of ination. Calculating
means and variances from histograms is not straightforward. Diebold, Tay and Wallis (1999) assume
the probability mass is uniform within each interval (in the context of calculating probability integral
7Both the denition and base year of the output-price index has changed over time. The vintages of data in the RTDSM
match the indices for which probability assessments and point forecasts were requested in the SPF. For 1969 to 1991, this
was the implicit GNP deator, for 1992 to 1995 the implicit GDP deator, and for 1996 to 2002 the chain-weighted deator.
8Later vintages of data contain revisions and denitional changes (see e.g., Landefeld, Seskin and Fraumeni (2008) for
a discussion of the revisions to US national accounts data).
9As of 1981:3, forecasts of the level of the output price for the current year were provided. Summing the quarterly
forecasts allows us to use data back to 1968:4. For the period from 1981:3 to 2005:1 we found that the di¤erences in the
two methods of calculating annual ination were small.
10The point forecasts of the growth rate are calculated using the actual data for the previous year from the RTDSM
available in the quarter of the survey. The one exception is that the RTDSM for 1996Q1 is missing the value for 1995Q4.
In constructing the year-on-year point forecast growth rates for the respondents to the 1996Q1 survey we use the previous-
quarter forecasts (of 1995Q4).
11See the online documentation provided by the Philadelphia Feb: Documentation for the Philadelphia Feds Survey of
Professional Forecasters, http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/. The problematic survey quarters are 1985.1,1986.1, 1968.4,
1969.4, 1970.4, 1971.4, 1972.3, 1972.4, 1973.4, 1975.4, 1976.4, 1977.4, 1978.4, 1979.2, 1979.3, 1979.4.
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Table 1: Example of a histogram return.
Interval Probability t F (t)
` <  20 0.0 -2 0
-2 to -1.1 0.0 -1 0
-1 to -0.1 0.0 0 0
0 to 0.9 0.0 1 0
1 to 1.9 0.0 2 0
2 to 2.9 0.20 3 0.2
3 to 3.9 0.50 4 0.7
4 to 4.9 0.30 5 1.0
5 to 5.9 0.0 6 1.0
`6+0 0.0 7 1.0
transforms), while Giordani and Söderlind (2003) t normal distributions to the histograms. Clements
(2009, 2010) uses both approaches. The uniformity assumption may tend to overstate the dispersion of
the distribution especially when there is a large di¤erence in the probability mass attached to adjacent
intervals, where it might be thought desirable to attach higher probabilities to points in the lower interval
near the boundary with the high probability interval. One might question the assumption of symmetry
implied by tting a normal distribution, and so we follow Engelberg et al. (2009) and t (unimodal)
generalized beta distribution. This distribution uses two parameters to describe the shape of beliefs, and
two more to give their support.
The approach can best be understood by an example. Suppose a respondents histogram is reported
as the rst two columns of table 1. When, as here, probability is assigned to three or more intervals,
the histogram can be approximated by a generalized beta distribution, as in Engelberg et al. (2009). To
illustrate, let t1; : : : ; t10 denote the right endpoints of the histogram intervals, so that F (t1) ; ; : : : ; F (t10)
are points on the individuals CDF (recorded in the fourth column of table 1). Thus we have F (t5) = 0,
F (t6) = 0:2, F (t7) = 0:7, and F (t8) = 1.
The generalized beta CDF is given by:
Beta (t; a; b; l; r) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if t  l
1
B(a;b)
Z t
l
(x l)a 1(r x)b 1
(r l)a+b 1 dx if l < t  r
1 if t > r
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
where the support of the distribution is determined by the parameters l and r, and where B (a; b) =
8
(  (a)   (b)) =  (a+ b), and   (a) =
Z 1
0
xa 1e xdx (see, e.g., Balakrishnan and Nevzorov (2003) for
technical details). We can impose unimodality by restricting a, b such that a > 1 and b > 1. The support
will depend on the distribution of probability across the histogram intervals. Suppose probability is only
attached to interior intervals, as in our example. We then set l and r equal to the left and right endpoints
of the intervals with positive probability. In our example, l = t5, r = t8. Then we minimize only over a
and b:
min
a>1;b>1
10X
i=1
[Beta (ti; a; b; t5; t8)  F (ti)]2
If there is mass in the lower tail interval, the we allow the support to extend below the left endpoint
of the lower interval, and l is a free parameter (similarly r if probability is assigned to the upper tail
interval. For example, if F (t1) = 0:2, F (t2) = 0:5, F (t3) = 0:7, and F (t4) = 1, so there is a 20% chance
that ination will be less than t1 (the lower open-ended interval), we estimate:
min
a>1;b>1;l>l
10X
i=1
[Beta (ti; a; b; l; t4)  F (ti)]2
where l is the lowest historical value of ination.
When X  beta (a; b; l; r), the rst two moments are given by:
EX = l +
(r   l) a
a+ b
and:
V ar X =
ab (r   l)2
(a+ b)
2
(a+ b+ 1)
:
When probability is assigned to fewer bins, the histogram less clearly reveals the individuals underlying
subjective distribution. Formally, we are unable to t the generalized beta distribution when there
are fewer than 3 bins, and although there are other solutions (e.g., joining the points on the CDF
joined by straight lines) we consider only those histograms with probability assigned to three or more
intervals. This means that we only consider those histograms which provide su¢ cient points on the CDF
to reasonably accurately reveal the underlying subjective distribution, when we wish to allow that the
distribution need not be symmetric.
As a robustness check, we also t normal distributions following Giordani and Söderlind (2003), by
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Figure 1: Estimated CDFs obtained by i) joining up CDP points with straight lines (solid line), ii) a
nomal approximation (dashed line ), and iii) tting a generalized beta distribution (longer-dashed line).
minimizing:
min
;2
10X
i=1

Fn
 
ti;; 
2
  F (ti)2
where Fn
 
; 2

is the normal CDF. The benet of imposing symmetry is that we only require the
histogram to have two non-zero probability intervals. Figure 1 reports the results of tting both the
beta and gaussian to the histogram in table 1. As seen the supports of the distribution di¤er - the normal
extends below 2 and above 5 (Fn

t5; ^; b2 > 0, and Fn t8; ^; b2 < 1). Of interest is whether the
results are sensitive to using beta distributions (and only histograms with 3 or more non-zero probability
bins) compared to imposing symmetry and using all histograms with 2 or more non-zero bins (by tting
normal distributions).
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4 Results
We estimate (3) and (4) for each individual respondent and for each forecast horizon, conditional on
there being at least ten observations. Given the relatively small number of observations for a respondent
for a given horizon, Zt was restricted to a constant. For both (3) and (4) we recorded whether the null
that 2;i = 0 was rejected at the 5% level, both with and without the forecast standard deviation; the
sign of the constant when signicant; whether the forecast standard deviation was signicant (2;i = 0);
the sign of this coe¢ cient when signicant; and whether the null that 2;i = 0 was rejected but the null
that 1;i = 0 was not (i.e., the forecast standard deviation was signicant but the constant was not).
To estimate (3) requires an assumption about what it is the forecasters are trying to forecast - the rst
announcement of the data or an earlier release. Following much of the literature we assume the latter,
specically, the second release of output-price data. Table 2 reports the proportion of times the various
hypotheses were rejected across all the regressions for a given horizon.
Firstly, the null of forecast bias (2;i = 0 in (3) with the forecast s.d. omitted) was rejected for 10%
of the respondents across all horizons, with more rejections at the longer than the shorter horizons.12
Over all horizons, roughly half the signicant biases (in the two-sided tests) are of each sign. When we
use the beta distribution to calculate moments, the proportion of rejections of 2;i = 0 halves whether
we include the forecast s.d. or the variance. The null that 1;i = 0 is rejected only 10% for the variance
(and less often for the s.d.), always with a negative coe¢ cient. In summary, the 10% rejection rate of
the test for bias (for a 5% level test) suggests little evidence of biased forecasts, and the proportion
of rejections equals the size when the uncertainty term is included. Testing for rationality (allowing
for asymmetric loss) as recommended by Pesaran and Weale (2006), for example, gives little cause for
concern for rational expectations proponents.
Testing 2;i = 0 in (4) tells a di¤erent story. Omitting the uncertainty term, we nd the null is
rejected in over half the cases, and it is always positive, suggesting Et;i (Yt+h) > ft+h;t;i. This rejects
rationality based on squared error loss, and suggests that this nding was largely masked by measurement
error13 when we considered (3). According to the asymmetric loss story, the signicance of the constant
term may be because of the omission of forecast uncertainty, which is expected to drive a wedge between
12When forecast moments are calculated using the beta distribution there are 73 regressions in total. The smaller number
of Q4 survey regressions reect the di¤erent timing conventions in the 1970s. When we use the normal distribution to
estimate moments, there are 144 regressions. The use of histograms with two non-zero intervals gives rise to twice as many
sets of 10 or more observations by individual and horizon.
13 In section 2 we argued that inference based on (3) would be less precise than on (4).
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the conditional mean and the point prediction. Including the uncertainty term results in 2;i = 0 being
rejected much less often (15% of the time for the forecast standard deviation), as would be expected
under asymmetric loss. However, the insignicance of the forecast uncertainty term is rejected only one
fth of the time (for the variance, less often for the s.d.) which is not consistent with asymmetry loss,
but might reect the relatively small samples and low power.
The results using the normal distribution to estimate forecast means and variances indicate fewer
rejections of 2;i = 0 when forecast uncertainty is omitted, but a similar fraction when this term is
included.
So far, our results are reasonably supportive of the asymmetric loss story, especially if the fail-
ure to nd 1;i signicant is attributed to low power or little variation in the uncertainty measure in
the sample. However, the asymmetric loss explanation assumes that the forecast means are unbiased,
E (yt+h   Et;i (yt+h)) = 0, and the expected squared errors of the forecast means should be less than
the expected squared errors of the point predictions (by construction, the mean minimizes squared-error
loss and the point prediction is optimal for an assumed non-symmetric loss function).
We investigate these issues with a further set of regressions, where we regard Et;i (Yt+h) and ft+h;t;i as
rival forecasts in a forecast encompassing framework (see, e.g., Clements and Harvey (2009) for a recent
review and exposition). Forecast encompassing relates to whether or not one forecast encapsulates all
the useful predictive information contained in a second forecast. If we use a squared error loss function
to measure forecast accuracy, then under the hypothesis of rationality and asymmetric loss we would
expect Et;i (Yt+h) to forecast encompass ft+h;t;i in the sense that in a pooled or combined forecast of the
two ft+h;t;i should receive zero weight. In terms of the general formulation of Fair and Shiller (1989),
Et;i (Yt+h) encompasses f t+h;t;i if 2 = 0 in the regression:
yt+h = + 1Et;i (Yt+h) + 2f t+h;t;i + "t+h:
We report the results of tests based on a version due to Chong and Hendry (1986):
yt+h   Et;i (Yt+h) = +  (Et;i (Yt+h)  ft+h;t;i) + "t+h (5)
and:
yt+h   ft+h;t;i = +  (ft+h;t;i   Et;i (Yt+h)) + "t+h (6)
12
where we would expect i) not to reject the null that  = 0 in (5) but ii) to reject  = 0 in (6). We also
report the number of times we reject  = 0 in (5), when the slope regressor is excluded, which is a test
for forecast bias of the histogram mean (the results for the point predictions are recorded in table 2).
When  = 0 in (5) it is not possible to improve the (squared-error loss) accuracy of the mean forecast
by combining it with the point prediction. Under rationality and asymmetric loss, the point prediction
di¤ers from the mean by a term which is independent of yt+h, so we would expect the optimal weight
on the point prediction to be zero. In (6) we would expect  = 1, so that the null that  = 0 should
be rejected. The results in table 4 are exactly the opposite of what would be expected assuming RE
forecasters with asymmetric loss functions. We reject the null that Et;i (Yt+h) encompasses ft+h;t;i for
two thirds of the individuals and horizons, but the null that ft+h;t;i encompasses Et;i (Yt+h) is rejected
for only one tenth of the individual/horizon pairs. Moreover, the unbiasedness of the mean forecasts is
rejected in around one third of cases. (The comparable gure for the point predictions was one tenth of
cases).
4.1 Robustness checks
A possible explanation of our ndings is that the way we estimate individualsmean forecasts results
in poor estimates relative to the means of the (unobserved) underlying subjective distributions. This is
possible, but we obtain similar results (table 2) whether we t gaussian or generalized beta distributions.
The results for the latter require (by construction) that positive probabilities are assigned to three or
more intervals. This reduces the scope for mis-measuring means compared to analyses that estimate
means for one and two-interval histograms. That the results using the two di¤erent distributions match
quite closely would suggest that mis-measurement of means is unlikely to be the explanation.
A second explanation is that we have used data from the earliest days of the survey and have
analyzed the data by individual. The location and widths of the histogram intervals has changed over
time. For most of the period, the ination histogram intervals were one percentage point, but for the
period 1981:Q3 to 1991:Q4 this was increased to two percentage points, so that these histograms are less
informative about the underlying continuous distributions, other things being equal. Further, the SPF
documentation warns of the possibility that the individual identiers might have been assigned to more
than one person during the earlier period.14
14See http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/spf-
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For these two reasons we truncate the sample of forecasts, and only consider the surveys from 1992:Q1
onwards. This covers a 19 year period and 76 surveys. The results are recorded in table 3 for testing
for rationality allowing asymmetric. This table is directly comparable to the full-sample results table 2.
Results are reported only for the forecast standard deviation measure of uncertainty (results for the whole
sample varied little with the measure of uncertainty). There are fewer instances of respondents providing
more than 10 returns to surveys in a given quarter of the year (and therefore of a given horizon), as
expected. Nevertheless, the overall picture is unchanged. The regression of the histogram mean minus
the point prediction yields a signicant di¤erence between the two for around a half of the regressions,
but this is reduced to around a tenth when the forecast standard deviation is included, as would be
expected under the asymmetric loss story. Table 5 indicates that the forecast encompassing tests are
also qualitatively similar. On the shortened sample, we reject the null that the mean encompasses the
point prediction for around two thirds of the regressions, but the reverse hypothesis is rejected in only
one tenth of cases. We conclude that the message from the SPF surveys from 1992:1 onwards is the
same as for the whole period.
We have used real-time actual values to calculate forecast errors, rather than the latest-available
values. Specically, we use the so-called nal values which are the second-quarterly release in the
RTDSMs. The last panel of table 5 indicates that the results of the forecasting encompassing tests are
qualitatively unchanged if we use the latest-available (2010:Q4 vintage) instead.
4.2 Related results
Elliott et al. (2008) consider the SPF 1-step ahead point forecasts of ination and output growth, and
nd results which are more favourable to the asymmetric loss hypothesis. They identify 51 forecasters
who made 20 or more one-step ahead ination forecasts, and nd that rationality is rejected at the 5%
level for 19 of the forecasters (around 40%) assuming symmetric loss (see their Table 1). This is higher
than the 10% we nd. A possible explanation is that they have larger average samples by individual.
Because we use the histograms to calculate the forecast moments to test for rationality, and because the
histograms refer to the survey year relative to the previous year, each survey will provide forecasts of
one of four horizons (depending on the quarter of the year the survey belongs to), so that on average we
documentation.pdf
14
will have only a quarter as many observations per individual as Elliott et al. (2008).15 However, their
rejections are based on testing e¢ ciency,  = 0 and  = 1 in:
yt+1 = + ft+1;t + vt
following Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), rather than testing for forecast bias (as in column (3) of our
table 2). Testing our data for e¢ ciency gave rejection rates of 25 to 30% (at the 5% signicance level),
bringing our ndings more in line with their results. There was more evidence against rationality at
the longer-horizons (i.e., for forecast returns to Q1 surveys), and fewer rejections at shorter horizons.
However, testing the same null ( = 0 and  = 1) in a model that includes a measure of forecast
uncertainty (namely the forecast standard deviations calculated from the histograms) had virtually no
e¤ect on the rate at which the null was rejected, contrary to what would be expected under asymmetric
loss.
Elliott et al. (2008) test for rationality allowing for asymmetric loss using the approach of Elliott
et al. (2005). They allow for a general loss function:
Lp (et+1;) =

+ (1  2) 1(et+1<0)
 jet+1jp (7)
where p = 2 gives a piecewise quadratic loss function, with under and over-predictions being pe-
nalized di¤erently when  6= 12 . Given (7), the forecast ft+1;t minimizes E [Lp (et+1;) j Ft] and
so solves E

L0p (et+1;) j Ft

= 0, where (when p = 2), L02 (et+1;) = et+1   (1  2) jet+1j =
2
 
  1(et+1<0)
 jet+1j. Letting vt be a vector of instruments, vt 2 Ft, the test of rationality al-
lowing for loss L2 is given by the GMM over-identication test where the population moments are
E fvt:L02 (et+1;)g = 0. They nd that rationality allowing for asymmetric loss is rejected for single-
gure numbers of respondents, the precise number depending on the instrument set. However, given the
small samples involved there are concerns over the power of GMM tests of overidentifying restrictions:
the failure to reject the null of rationality might simply reect low power.
15On the plus side, we consider 1 to 4-quarter ahead forecasts of annual year-on-year ination, as opposed to simply
1-step ahead forecasts of next quarters ination rate. Patton and Timmermann (2010) have shown that forecasters tend
to put relatively more weight on new information at shorter horizons than at longer horizons when expectations about
the long-run value receive greater weight. One might expect that the degree to which forecasters might aim to under or
over-predict would also depend on the forecast horizon.
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5 Conclusions
In the recent literature it has been suggested that symmetric loss ought to be regarded as just a special
case of more general loss functions, and that the presumption of symmetric loss might be misplaced
for macro-forecasters. If forecasters have asymmetric loss functions, then we would expect their point
forecasts to be biased, and the bias should depend on the conditional forecast uncertainty. However,
the small samples of forecasts we have by individual for a given horizon might explain why we often
fail to reject the null of unbiasedness (irrespective of whether loss is really asymmetric). Our preferred
test analyses the di¤erence between the point predictions and (estimates of) the conditional means and
appears to have greater power, and is consistent with the asymmetry story in that the di¤erence is zero
mean once we allow for forecast uncertainty. However, the outcomes of the forecast encompassing tests
provide telling evidence against asymmetric loss: we tend to reject the null that the mean forecasts
encompass the point predictions, under squared error loss, but not vice versa.
We have assumed throughout that the histograms accurately reect the individualstrue beliefs, in the
sense that the histograms are not intentionally biasedrepresentations of the individualsprobability
assessments. Note that this is distinct from the measurement issues of estimating forecast moments
from the histograms, which we have tackled by reporting a sensitivity analysis. If forecasters report
probability distributions in the form of histograms with in-builtbias, then the point predictions could be
optimal for an asymmetric loss function, and could simultaneously be more accurate than the conditional
meanforecasts, when both are judged by squared-error loss. It is recognized that forecasters may have
incentives not to report their true beliefs (see, e.g., Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), Laster, Bennett
and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006)): they may balance the minimization of forecast
errors against conicting aims, such as convincing the market that they are well-informed, or of attracting
media attention. However, one might expect these incentives to relate to the relatively higher-prole
point predictions, rather than histogram forecasts (or probability assessments more generally) which
tend to receive less attention.
Asymmetric loss requires forecasters bias their forecasts away from what they expect the outcome to
be to an increasing extent as the degree of uncertainty about the future increases, that is, at just those
times when they are liable to make large forecast errors anyway. One might suppose that credibility
issues arise when ones forecasts are su¢ ciently poor(when judged by conventional criteria such as bias
and squared-error loss) such that the assumption of symmetric loss might not be unreasonable.
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Table 4: Forecast encompassing tests, 1968:4 to 2010:4
Survey # regns.   < 0  
in eqn. (5) in eqn. (5) in eqn. (5) in eqn. (6)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Generalized beta
All 73 0.32 1.00 0.66 0.08
Q1 29 0.10 1.00 0.41 0.07
Q2 24 0.42 1.00 0.67 0.13
Q3 13 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.00
Q4 7 0.29 1.00 1.00 0.14
Gaussian
All 144 0.22 1.00 0.66 0.11
Q1 46 0.09 1.00 0.39 0.11
Q2 44 0.32 1.00 0.68 0.09
Q3 32 0.31 1.00 0.88 0.16
Q4 22 0.14 1.00 0.86 0.09
Notes. Column 3 reports the proportion of individual regressions for which we reject i = 0 at the 5%
level in regression (5). Column 4 reports the proportion of these rejections for which the constant term
is negative. Column 5 is the proportion of regressions for which we reject i = 0 at the 5% level in eqn.
(5) - the null that the mean forecast encompasses the point prediction, and column 6 is the same but
for eqn. (6), where the null is that the point prediction encompasses the mean. The actual values of the
inlfation rates are real-time- the second-quarterly release vintage.
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Table 5: Forecast encompassing tests, Restricted sample, 1992:1 to 2010:4
Survey # regns.   < 0  
in eqn. (5) in eqn. (5) in eqn. (5) in eqn. (6)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Generalized beta, real-time actuals
All 42 0.43 1.00 0.69 0.12
1 15 0.20 1.00 0.40 0.13
2 13 0.54 1.00 0.77 0.15
3 9 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.00
4 5 0.40 1.00 0.80 0.20
Gaussian, real-time actuals
All 77 0.30 1.00 0.69 0.10
1 22 0.14 1.00 0.45 0.14
2 22 0.45 1.00 0.77 0.09
3 16 0.44 1.00 0.81 0.13
4 17 0.18 1.00 0.76 0.06
Generalized beta, 2010:4 vintage actuals
All 42 0.12 1.00 0.60 0.12
1 15 0.07 1.00 0.27 0.13
2 13 0.23 1.00 0.69 0.08
3 9 0.11 1.00 0.89 0.00
4 5 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.40
Notes. Layout is identical to table 4, repeated here for convenience. Column 3 reports the proportion
of individual regressions for which we reject i = 0 at the 5% level in regression (5). Column 4 reports
the proportion of these rejections for which the constant term is negative. Column 5 is the proportion
of regressions for which we reject i = 0 at the 5% level in eqn. (5) - the null that the mean forecast
encompasses the point prediction, and column 6 is the same but for eqn. (6), where the null is that the
point prediction encompasses the mean.
References
Balakrishnan, N., and Nevzorov, V. B. (eds.)(2003). A Primer on Statistical Distributions: John Wiley
& Sons, New Jersey.
Capistrán, C., and Timmermann, A. (2009). Disagreement and biases in ination expectations. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 41, 365396.
Chong, Y. Y., and Hendry, D. F. (1986). Econometric evaluation of linear macro-economic models.
Review of Economic Studies, 53, 671690. Reprinted in Granger, C. W. J. (ed.) (1990), Modelling
Economic Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Clements, M. P. (2009). Internal consistency of survey respondentsforecasts: Evidence based on the
Survey of Professional Forecasters. In Castle, J. L., and Shephard, N. (eds.), The Methodology and
20
Practice of Econometrics. A Festschrift in Honour of David F. Hendry. Chapter 8, pp. 206226.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clements, M. P. (2010). Explanations of the Inconsistencies in Survey Respondents Forecasts. European
Economic Review, 54, 536549.
Clements, M. P., and Harvey, D. I. (2009). Forecasting combination and encompassing. In Mills, T. C.,
and Patterson, K. (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 2: Applied Econometrics,
pp. 169198: Palgrave MacMillan.
Coibion, O., and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2011). What can survey forecasts tell us about information rigidi-
ties?. College of William and Mary.
Croushore, D. (1993). Introducing: The Survey of Professional Forecasters. Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia Business Review, November/December, 313.
Croushore, D., and Stark, T. (2001). A real-time data set for macroeconomists. Journal of Econometrics,
105, 111130.
Diebold, F. X., Tay, A. S., and Wallis, K. F. (1999). Evaluating density forecasts of ination: The
Survey of Professional Forecasters. In Engle, R. F., and White, H. (eds.), Cointegration, Causality
and Forecasting: A Festschrift in Honour of Clive Granger, pp. 7690. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Ehrbeck, T., and Waldmann, R. (1996). Why are professional forecasters biased? agency versus behav-
ioral explanations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1), 2140.
Elliott, G., Komunjer, I., and Timmermann, A. (2005). Estimation and testing of forecast rationality
under exible loss. Review of Economic Studies, 72, 11071125.
Elliott, G., Komunjer, I., and Timmermann, A. (2008). Biases in macroeconomic forecasts: Irrationality
or asymmetric loss. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 122157.
Engelberg, J., Manski, C. F., and Williams, J. (2009). Comparing the point predictions and subjective
probability distributions of professional forecasters. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,
27, 3041.
Fair, R. C., and Shiller, R. J. (1989). The informational content of ex ante forecasts. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 71, 325331.
Giordani, P., and Söderlind, P. (2003). Ination forecast uncertainty. European Economic Review, 74,
21
10371060.
Granger, C. W. J. (1969). Prediction with a generalized cost of error function. Operations Research
Quarterly, 20, 199207.
Kandel, E., and Zilberfarb, B. Z. (1999). Di¤erential interpretation of information in ination forecasts.
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81, 217226.
Lahiri, K., and Sheng, X. (2008). Evolution of forecast disagreement in a Bayesian learning model.
Journal of Econometrics, 144, 325340.
Landefeld, J. S., Seskin, E. P., and Fraumeni, B. M. (2008). Taking the pulse of the economy. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 22, 193216.
Laster, D., Bennett, P., and Geoum, I. S. (1999). Rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 293318.
Mankiw, N. G., and Reis, R. (2002). Sticky information versus sticky prices: a proposal to replace the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 12951328.
Mankiw, N. G., Reis, R., and Wolfers, J. (2003). Disagreement about ination expectations. mimeo,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.
Manzan, S. (2011). Di¤erential interpretation in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 43, 9931017.
Mincer, J., and Zarnowitz, V. (1969). The evaluation of economic forecasts. In Mincer, J. (ed.), Economic
Forecasts and Expectations. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ottaviani, M., and Sorensen, P. N. (2006). The strategy of professional forecasting. Journal of Financial
Economics, 81, 441466.
Patton, A. J., and Timmermann, A. (2007). Testing forecast optimality under unknown loss. Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 102, 11721184.
Patton, A. J., and Timmermann, A. (2010). Why do forecasters disagree? lessons from the term structure
of cross-sectional dispersion. Journal of Monetary Economics, 57, 803820.
Patton, A. J., and Timmermann, A. (2011). Predictability of output growth and ination: A multi-
horizon survey approach. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 29, 397410.
Pesaran, M. H., and Weale, M. (2006). Survey expectations. In Elliott, G., Granger, C., and Timmer-
mann, A. (eds.), Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Volume 1. Handbook of Economics 24, pp.
22
715776: Elsevier, Horth-Holland.
Rich, R., and Tracy, J. (2003). Modeling uncertainty: Predictive accuracy as a proxy for predictive
condence. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Sta¤ Reports, no. 161, February.
Sims, C. A. (2003). Implications of rational inattention. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50, 665690.
Varian, H. R. (1975). A Bayesian approach to real estate assessment. In Fienberg, S. E., and Zellner, A.
(eds.), Studies in Bayesian econometrics and statistics in honor of Leonard J. Savage, pp. 195208.
Amsterdam: North Holland.
Woodford, M. (2001). Imperfect common knowledge and the e¤ects of monetary policy. In Aghion, P.,
Frydman, R., Stiglitz, J., and Woodford, M. (eds.), Knowledge, Information, and Expectations in
Modern Macroeconomics: In honor of Edmund Phelps: Princeton University Press.
Zarnowitz, V. (1969). The new ASA-NBER Survey of Forecasts by Economic Statisticians. The American
Statistician, 23, No. 1, 1216.
Zarnowitz, V., and Lambros, L. A. (1987). Consensus and uncertainty in economic prediction. Journal
of Political Economy, 95, 591621.
Zellner, A. (1986). Biased predictors, rationality and the evaluation of forecasts. Economics Letters, 21,
4548.
23
